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Sustaining the Growth of Mobile
Money Services in Developing
from
Lessons
Nations:
Overregulation in the United
States
Amanda Bloch Kernan*
ABSTRACT

Billions of people around the world are excluded from the
formal financial system and forced to store, transfer, and borrow
money by using inefficient and unsafe methods. The recent
introduction of mobile money programs in developing countries
is revolutionizing financial inclusion by allowing users to store
and transfer money on their mobile phones, thereby eliminating
the need to access a bank or an internet connection.
Unfortunately, fears that these programs will be used to launder
money and finance terrorism have led the international
community to develop and implement restrictive anti-money
laundering policies that will likely impede the growth and
accessibility of these programs. This Article posits that these
policies will ultimately cause financial institutions to terminate
relationships with mobile money providers, resulting in less
secure mobile money transactionsand more transactions taking
place through the informal economy. This conclusion is based on
the history of money-service businesses in the United States,
which lost access to financial services due to severe penalties,
overzealous regulators, and stringent anti-money laundering
regulations that were applied in unpredictable ways.
This Article encourages the internationalcommunity to look
to gatekeeper theory to create an anti-money laundering regime
that incentivizes financial institutions to remain in the mobile
money industry. By applying gatekeeper theory and creating an
optimal liability regime, the international community will be
able to incentivize financial institutionsto remain in the industry
while compelling them to dedicate the properamount of resources

* I am very grateful to Helen Scott, Gerald Rosenfeld, and Karen Brenner of the
Jacobson Leadership Program in Law and Business at NYU School of Law for their
support on this Article. I also owe substantial appreciation to Emily Winston, Sarah
Hewitt, and Sherry Wicker for their thoughtful comments and guidance. All errors are
my own.
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toward identifying and preventing money laundering and
terroristfinancing.
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INTRODUCTION

In Bangladesh, Sabina Begum works long hours as a seamstress
and provides the only financial support for her parents and daughter,
1
who live in a village three hundred kilometers away. She does not
have time to go to a bank and her only day off is during the weekend,
when the bank is closed. In the past, she had to use a transport to send
money to her family. She explained, "I used to give the money to bus
drivers headed that way. Sometimes the money got lost or arrived
late." 2 Now, Sabina goes to a local grocer every month, pays a small
fee, and the grocer transfers money via a mobile phone to a tea shop in
3
her family's village, where her father picks up the money.
In Malawi, where thousands of people are suffering from hunger
due to a drought, the Malawi Red Cross Society is utilizing mobile
4
payments to feed ten thousand hunger victims in the country. The
organization provides mobile phones to its beneficiaries and sends
families a monthly cash transfer of approximately USD$43. This cash
allows families to purchase, over a five-month period, a fifty-kilogram
5
bag of maize, five kilograms of beans, and two liters of cooking oil.
In Liberia, teachers in remote locations often travel long distances
to receive their salaries and are further burdened by administrative
failures, logistical challenges related to the transport of cash, and
corruption, which all tend to prevent teachers from receiving payment
in full and on time. These breakdowns are devastating to education
systems and the surrounding communities. In response, the Liberian
government and the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) launched a program to pay rural teachers'
salaries directly through mobile money platforms. 6 This pilot program
aims to guarantee teachers their full salaries and prevent teachers
from abandoning their classrooms for days at a time in order to
withdraw their salaries from formal financial institutions.
These stories are becoming commonplace throughout the
developing world. Mobile money platforms are providing populations

See Syed Zain Al-Mahmood, Mobile Banking Provides Lifeline for
1.
Bangladeshis, WALL ST. J. (June 23, 2015, 10:15 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/mobil
e-banking-provides-lifeline-for-bangladeshis- 1435043314 [https://perma.cc/AE4G-LBV
C] (archived Aug. 4, 2018).
Id.
2.
Id.
3.
See Mwayi Mkandawire, Cash Transfers Helping Malawi Hunger Victims
4.
Survive, MALAWI 24 (May 28, 2016), http://malawi24.com/2016/05/28/cash-transfershelping-malawi-hunger-victims-survive/ [https://perma.cc/338E-5KN6] (archived Aug. 6,
2018).
Id.
5.
See Arrington Ballah, Gov't Launches Pilot Programto Pay Teachers'Salaries
6.
via Mobile Money, BUSH CHICKEN (May 28, 2016), http://www.bushchicken.com/govtlaunches-pilot-program-to-pay-teachers-salaries-via-mobile-money/
[https://perma.cclVH6H-4J4J] (archived Aug. 6, 2018).
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that have been excluded from the formal financial sector for
generations-including poor migrants, women, and foreign aid
recipients-with access to safe and secure financial services for the
first time. By sending, receiving, and storing money on mobile phones,
users are able to develop financial autonomy and avoid the risks
associated with transacting in cash. Although mobile money programs
are revolutionizing financial inclusion in the developing world, fears
that these programs will be used to launder money and finance
terrorism have led the international community to develop and
implement restrictive anti-money laundering policies that will likely
impede the growth and accessibility of these programs.
This Article argues that the anti-money laundering policies being
promoted throughout the developing world will ultimately cause
financial institutions to terminate relationships with mobile money
providers, resulting in less-secure mobile money transactions and more
transactions taking place through the informal economy. This
conclusion is based, in part, on the history of money-service businesses
in the United States, which lost access to financial services over the
past decade due to overzealous regulators and excessive financial
penalties related to financial institutions' anti-money laundering
functions. The same policies that caused money-service businesses,
which provide financial services for unbanked and underbanked
communities in the United States, to go out of business are now being
implemented in developing countries with respect to mobile money
transactions.
In order to prevent financial institutions from refusing to
participate in mobile money programs due to these restrictive antimoney laundering policies, this Article proposes that the international
community look to gatekeeper theory to create a regime that
incentivizes financial institutions to remain in the industry. The
gatekeeper theory of liability imposes liability on professionals, or
gatekeepers, for wrongs committed by their clients. Financial
institutions providing services to money-service businesses in the
United States were given gatekeeper-like responsibilities without the
incentives required for a successful model, and international antimoney laundering policies are poised to cause the same result for
financial institutions participating in mobile money transactions. A
successful gatekeeper model requires, among other things, that the
aggregate costs of wrongdoing exceed the aggregate costs of precaution,
but this may not be the case when it comes to the current anti-money
laundering regime. By applying gatekeeper theory, the international
community will be able to encourage financial institutions to remain in
the industry while compelling them to dedicate the proper amount of
resources toward identifying and preventing money laundering and
terrorist financing.
Part III of this Article sets forth the elements involved in a mobile
money transaction and explores the implications of mobile money
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programs on financial inclusion and financial integrity. Part III also
discusses the regulation of mobile money across the world, particularly
focusing on the Financial Action Task Force and its anti-money
laundering Recommendations that are applicable to mobile money
transactions.
Part IV provides an overview of the US anti-money laundering
laws applicable to money-service businesses and explains how
enforcement of those laws caused financial institutions to terminate
their relationships with money-service businesses. This Part also
demonstrates the similarities between US anti-money laundering laws
and those being promoted in the international community.
Last, Part V proposes a solution to prevent international financial
institutions from terminating their relationships with mobile money
programs in the same way that US institutions terminated their
relationships with money-service businesses. Because financial
institutions are given gatekeeper-like responsibilities when it comes to
preventing money laundering and terrorist financing, this Article
argues that gatekeeper theory can be applied to create a functioning
regime. In particular, it argues that the current policies will not lead
to an optimal liability regime and discusses some of the ways in which
an optimal liability regime can be achieved; that governments should
increase the incentives for financial institutions to become and remain
involved in mobile money transactions, including by offering corporate
subsidies and rewards for identifying money launderers and terrorists;
and that international governments should enable financial
institutions to build reputational capital in the mobile money industry.

II. MOBILE MONEY SERVICES

Approximately 2.5 billion adults around the world lack access to a
bank account. This unbanked population uses inefficient and unsafe
methods to store money (often by hiding cash in their homes) and
transfer money (often in person), and they are forced to pay exorbitant
interest rates when borrowing money. While banks have not found it
profitable to serve this population in the past, the Gates Foundation
predicts that mobile phones will transform the lives of two billion poor
people over the next fifteen years by providing them with access to
bank accounts and financial services. 7 By allowing people to store and
transfer money on their mobile phones, companies are serving poor
customers in remote areas while profiting through small commissions
on millions of transactions. This Part describes the technical aspects of

See BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUNDATION, OUR BIG BET FOR THE FUTURE:
7.
2015 GATES ANNUAL LETTER 17 (2015), https://al2015.gatesnotesazure.comlassets/media
[https://perma.cc/9Q2T-AQ4Q]
/documents/2015 GatesAnnualLetterEN.pdf
(archived Aug. 6, 2018).

1114

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 51:1109

a mobile money transaction, and then sets forth the financial inclusion
benefits along with the financial integrity risks associated with mobile
money programs.
A. Mobile Money Transactions
Mobile money is, essentially, a form of electronic money that
requires neither a computer nor an internet connection. While most of
the world lacks access to formal financial services, approximately 63
percent of the world's population owns a mobile device and most of the
world is covered by mobile networks.8 Through mobile money services,
customers can convert cash into electronic money and vice versa
through a nearby retail shop; store electronic value in the form of an
account; and engage in electronic transactions, including sending
remittances to family members in different locations and paying for
goods and services.9 The service consists of a financial service and a
telecom service, and the provider of the financial service is required to
comply with certain anti-money laundering requirements.
The Brookings Institution found that in 2014, sixteen markets had
more mobile money accounts than bank accounts, and there were
nearly three hundred million registered mobile money accounts
globally.1 0 While this number is promising, it represents only 8 percent
of the mobile connections in the markets where mobile money services
are available, meaning there are substantial opportunities to expand
access to these services.1 1
While a variety of complex mobile money systems exist around the
world, a study by the World Bank found that all, mobile money
transactions contain the same five elements or functions arranged in a
specific order. 12 The first step always requires access to a mobile
communications service, and this access is always provided by a mobile
network operator (MNO).1 3 MNOs provide both prepaid and postpaid
services, depending on the MNO and the customer, and they are

8.
See Number of mobile phone users worldwide from 2015 to 2020 (in billions),
STATISTA,
https://www.statista.com/statistics/274774/forecast-of-mobile-phone-usersworldwide/ (last visited Sept. 4, 2018) [https://perma.cclR9Q4-NK53] (archived Aug. 6,
2018).
9.
See Claire Alexandre & Lynn Chang Eisenhart, Mobile Money as an Engine
of FinancialInclusion and Lynchpin of FinancialIntegrity, 8 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS
285, 289 (2013).
10.
JOHN D. ViLLASENOR ET AL., THE 2015 BROOKINGS FINANCIAL AND DIGITAL
INCLUSION PROJECT REPORT 8 (2015), http://www.brookings.edul-/medialResearch/Files
IReports/2015/08/financial-digital-inclusion-2015-villasenor-west-lewis/fdip2o15.pdfl1a
=en [https://perma.cc/SRP2-LRML] (archived Aug. 6, 2018) [hereinafter BROOKINGS
REPORT].

11.
Id.
12.
See PIERRE-LAURENT CHATAIN ET AL., PROTECTING MOBILE MONEY AGAINST
FINANCIAL CRIMES: GLOBAL POLICY CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS 9-10 (2011).
13.
Id. at 12.
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generally prohibited by data and privacy laws from viewing the content
14
of a mobile communication, meaning they are content neutral.
The second step in a mobile money. transaction is the customer
interface, where a customer gives an order to the mobile money system
and receives information in response. 1 5 The third step is transaction
processing, which typically involves a central computer that
automatically handles the transaction instructions received through
the customer interface. 16 The transaction processor assesses the
feasibility of a transaction-for instance, if a customer seeks to transfer
money to another user, the processor verifies that the customer has
sufficient funds in his account and that no transaction limits would be
breached by the transfer.1 7 The fourth step involves account provision,
such as retaining account balance information and transaction
histories.1 8
The fifth and final step is always settlement of the transaction,
19
and this step is always performed by a financial institution. Here,
the money that a sender puts into the system is delivered to the
recipient, minus any fees involved in the transaction. A settlement
between two accounts at the same financial institution generally
requires just a reconciling of the accounts, while a settlement between
accounts at different institutions requires a bank to transfer money
20
from one account to the other.
Retail outlets play a central role in mobile money transactionsthey are used to open accounts and exchange cash for credit in the
system, or vice versa. The retail outlet acts as the customer interface
for both the user and the mobile money system, and it generates a
21
small fee for facilitating each transaction. Generally, in order to open
an account or transfer money, a customer will bring cash to the retail
outlet, which then takes the cash and transfers money from its own
account to the customer's account. When a customer seeks to withdraw
cash from its account, the retail outlet transfers money from the
customer's account to its own account, and provides the customer with

Id.
14.
Id. at 13.
15.
Id.
16.
Id.
17.
Id. at 14.
18.
Id. at 12, 15. The term "financial institution" refers to any natural or legal
19.
person who accepts deposits and other repayable funds from the public by way of
business and/or provides money or value transfer services to its customers but does not
include natural or legal persons who solely provide telecom services. See FIN. ACTION
TASK FORCE, INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE
(2018), http://www.fatf117-18
FINANCING OF TERRORISM & PROLIFERATION
2
02
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20Recommendations%
012.pdf [https://perma.cc/7AJ5-K94C] (archived Aug. 6, 2018) [hereinafter FATF

RECOMMENDATIONS].

20.
21.

See CHATAIN, supra note 12, at 14.
See id. at 16.
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cash. Retail outlets are usually required to maintain accounts at a
traditional financial institution, but their transaction amounts and
frequency limits are higher than individual customers' limits. 2 2
While the first and last functions are always provided by an MNO
and a financial institution, respectively, the middle three functions can
be performed by the MNO, a financial institution, or a third-party
provider. For example, Safaricom in Kenya, arguably the most
successful mobile money system in existence, is an MNO that performs
the functions of customer interface, transaction processing, and
account provision. 23 The bank's only role is to hold the money in the
system in a trust account. It does not monitor or control the day-to-day
transactions of customers, only "the withdrawals from and deposits to
the system by retail outlets that have bank accounts at the same
bank." 24 Celpay in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, on the other
hand, is a third-party provider that performs the functions of customer
interface, transaction processing, and account provision. 25 It contracts
with MNOs and banks in order to provide its payment services to
customers, and it uses its own staff members instead of retail outlets
to process transactions and maintain account records. 26 Since it does
not use retail outlets, customers must cash-in and cash-out at a bank
that has an agreement with Celpay, meaning all customers must have
access to the bank as well as a bank account.
B. The Benefits of Mobile Money
1. Financial Inclusion
Financial inclusion is an essential facet of economic development,
and mobile money services offer individuals who have always relied on
inefficient informal financial services access to the formal financial
sector. By safely and securely storing and transferring money on a
mobile device, customers avert the risks associated with storing and
transferring cash in person, such as robbery, fraud, police corruption,
accidental
fires or infestations,
and
significant currency
depreciation. 27 Poor migrants are able to easily and cheaply send
remittances home through these services; it is estimated that nearly

.

22.
See id. at 17.
23.
See id. at 22 ("Safaricom manages the transaction to the point of settlement
[and] manages records, processes the transaction, and provides both the interface and
the mobile service.").
24.
See id.
25.
See id. at 23.
26.
See id. at 23-24.
27.
See Shanthi Elizabeth Senthe, Transformative Technology in Microfinance:
Delivering Hope Electronically?, 13 PIrT. J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 1, 7 (2012) (discussing
physical security risks of storing physical cash rather than storing it in a mobile bank
account).
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$440 billion in remittances were sent in 2010, 75 percent of which was
sent to developing countries. 2 8 In fact, 43 percent of Kenya's gross
domestic product is now transferred via mobile products. 29 As
customers grow their money in an account, they gain financial
autonomy and develop a relationship with a banking service. This
promotes entrepreneurship, empowers those who have traditionally
been excluded from formal financial channels, and gives customers
hope for a better economic future.
The growth of mobile money systems is particularly significant for
30
women, who lack access to the financial sector in many places. As of
2014, there was a difference of 7 percentage points between the
percentage of men and of women with accounts at a formal financial
institution or mobile money provider (65 percent versus 58 percent,
respectively). 3 1 Mobile money allows women to engage in personal or
business transactions from any geographic location with a mobile
device, including their own homes, without others knowing about the
transactions or being able to access their accounts. 32 Women are
additionally able to receive funds via digital financial services directly
from the government, which enables governments to promote policies
aimed at increasing women's financial inclusion in developing
33

countries.
The rapid growth of mobile banking is poised to revolutionize the
world on a macroeconomic level as well, as poor communities in
developing nations become market participants for the first time.
When customers exchange cash for electronic money, capital becomes
mobilized in areas that have always been spatially excluded from
financial institutions. Mobile money allows wire remittances, foreign
investment, and foreign aid to reach villages directly, lowering the
transaction costs and risks of corruption and fraud that are associated
34
This
with the transfer of cash, which is difficult to trace and fungible.
is particularly true in post-conflict and fragile zones, where foreign aid
is deftly needed but financial institutions and landline infrastructure

See Jane K. Winn, Governance of Global Mobile Money Networks: The Role of
28.
Technical Standards, 8 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 197, 207 (2013).
Arthur Velker, The Digital Revolution that Will Democratize Wealth, Insights
29.
with Chris Skinner, IRISH TECH NEWS (Feb. 4, 2018), https://irishtechnews.ie/the-digitalrevolution-that-will-democratize-wealth-insights-with-chris-skinner/
[https://perma.cc/7LA9-RZFY] (archived Aug. 6, 2018). Remittances totaled $429 billion
in 2016. Id.
BROOKINGS REPORT, supra note 10, at 7.
30.
Id.
31.
See Senthe, supra note 27, at 57.
32.
See BROOKINGS REPORT, supra note 10, at 7.
33.
See id. at 8 ("[I]n Mexico, the government saved an estimated $1.3 billion
34.
annually by shifting to electronic payments. Other governments, such as that of India,
have recognized the value of digital transfers to reduce 'leakage'-payments that do not
reach recipients.").
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are weak. 3 5 Mobile phone companies tend to expand their services into
these areas before other major enterprises, making mobile money a
safer and more reliable way to send aid. 36 Similarly, "[p]eople working
on the front lines in conflict areas, disaster zones, or health crises need
to get paid. Mobile payments are a way to do that quickly and
efficiently." 3 7
In countries where the rule of law is weak, corruption is
particularly prevalent. Corruption reduces economic growth by
discouraging private investment. 3 8 By transitioning from anonymous
cash transactions to traceable electronic transfers, the opportunity for
and incidence of corruption will decline. And, as economic development
and financial inclusion expand to poor communities, the level of
poverty and poverty-related crimes in those areas will decrease as
well.3 9 A report from the Imperial College and Citi found that a 10
percent increase in digital money readiness along with a
commensurate increase in adoption for the countries included in the
study could help up to approximately 220 million individuals enter the
formal financial sector. 4 0 "This translates to an additional $1 trillion
moving from the informal economy to the formal economy." 4 1
Mobile money not only allows individuals and communities to
become financial participants, but it also generates a significant
amount of data that can be used to fight crime and promote financial
inclusion initiatives and economic development. Regulators, for
instance, can collect data from MNOs and financial institutions to
identify and trace money laundering and terrorist financing
transactions. Foreign aid organizations and private investors can
analyze the data to better understand where their money is actually
going and the efficacy of their programs. 4 2 For all of these reasons,
mobile money programs represent a groundbreaking opportunity to
improve the lives of disadvantaged people across the globe.

35.
See Emery S. Kobor, The Role of Anti-Money Laundering Law in Mobile
Money Systems in Developing Countries, 8 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 303, 308-10 (2013).
36.
See CHATAIN, supra note 12, at 158 (discussing the importance of the
expansion of mobile money services for financial inclusion, reduction of transaction costs,
and improvement of nations' payment infrastructures).
37.
Sue-Lynn Moses, DethroningCash as King. Why These Major FundersAre So
Hyped About DigitalMoney, INSIDE PHILANTHROPY (May 27, 2016), http://www.insideph
ilanthropy.com/home/2016/5/27/dethroning-cash-as-king-why-these-major-funders-areso-hyped.html [https://perma.cc/6F8K-TGPM] (archived Aug. 6, 2018).
38.
Kobor, supra note 35, at 310.
39.
See CHATAIN, supra note 12, at 145.
40.
See BROOKINGS REPORT, supra note 10, at 7.
41.
Id.
42.
See Colin C. Richard, How the U.S. Government's Market Activities Can
Bolster Mobile Banking Abroad, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 765, 768 (2011).
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2. Financial Integrity
By decreasing the use of cash and increasing the accessibility,
safety, and traceability of financial transactions, mobile money
programs have proven to promote financial inclusion and economic
development. Therefore, governments around the world should be
doing everything in their power to expand and protect the scope of
these services. However, accompanying the development of mobile
money systems are a plethora of risks, some actual and some perceived,
that draw attention from both consumers and financial regulators, and
fear of these risks carries the potential to restrain the growth of safe
mobile money services.
In order for users, especially those who have always stored their
money in cash, to "buy in" to mobile money and utilize the services
being offered, they must feel confident that they can trust the system.
Some of the financial integrity risks to consumers include fraud, such
as SIM card skimming and swaps; technology risks and failures that
could result in lost or stolen money; data and privacy breaches that
could result in a consumer's identity being stolen or personal
information being used by governments for improper purposes; and
agent misconduct by the retail outlet or an employee in the system that
43
could cause financial loss.
Financial regulators and international governments are
concerned with the stability and integrity of the financial system.
There is substantial fear that mobile money channels will be used to
launder money and finance terrorism. In a typical money laundering
scenario, money is introduced into the financial system and then
moved through several accounts (known as "layering") in order to
obfuscate the origin of the funds. 4 4 The money can ultimately be
returned to the money launderer, appearing as though it is from a
legitimate source. 4 5 Money laundering is used by drug traffickers,
arms dealers, and terrorists to enable criminal activity and utilize
formal financial services, which are safer and cheaper than transacting
in cash. 46 Mobile money programs rely on vast networks of agents to
provide cash-in and out services, complicating the already difficult
process of identifying and monitoring suspicious transactions and
parties.

43.
See Jamie M. Zimmerman, The Emergence of Responsible Digital Finance,
CTR. FOR FIN. INCLUSION (July 21, 2014), http://cfi-blog.org/2014/07/21/the-emergenceof-responsible-digital-finance/ [https://perma.cc/QGW8-R8UW] (archived Aug. 6, 2018)
(discussing the risks related to digital financial services).
44.
See CHATAIN, supra note 12, at 35.
45.
See Leslie Gutierrez, Bolstering Competition in the InternationalRemittance
Market: A Proposal for Reforming the Current Regulatory Licensing Framework
Governing Money TransmissionBusinesses, 10 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 207, 211 (2014).
46.
Id. at 212.
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The World Bank identified four primary risk categories that are
currently guiding efforts to develop anti-money laundering legislation
applicable to mobile money transactions: anonymity, elusiveness,
rapidity, and poor oversight. 4 7
Anonymity: The risk that a criminal gains access to mobile money
services using a false identity. These.risks are higher in countries with
weak national identification frameworks or methods to verify a
person's identity and are compounded by the fact that mobile money
transactions often do not require face-to-face engagement. 4 8
Elusiveness: The risk that criminals can use methods, such as
mobile phone pooling and microstructuring (keeping transactions
below the money laundering threshold), to prevent the detection of
money laundering. 4 9
Rapidity: The risk that criminals can use mobile money programs
quickly and anywhere, aiding efforts to layer a transaction and
obscuring the origin of funds to complicate a transaction. 5 0
Poor oversight: Newly developed mobile money programs may fall
outside the purview of current anti-money laundering regimes in
certain countries, creating conditions that increase the likelihood of
abuse arising from the three previous risks.51
Regulators are also concerned about the systemic risk inherent in
the rise of successful mobile money programs. Monopolies are likely to
emerge at multiple phases in the system. Due to the principal-agent
relationship involved in most mobile money transactions, financial
institutions retain legal responsibility for actions committed by retail
outlets. 5 2 In order to manage those risks, financial institutions may
deny agency status to independent players, locking them out of the
system. 5 Moreover, most MNO-led models concentrate transaction
activities in the hands of one or two telecom companies. 54 These
companies maintain industry dominance and, in turn, concentrate the
settlement of mobile money transactions in the hands of one or two
financial institutions.5 5 Interruptions to the mobile network service or
a financial institution's ability to complete transactions could have a

47.
See CHATAIN, supra note 12, at 33-35.
48.
See id. at 33.
49.
See id. at 34-35.
50.
See id. at 35.
51.
See id. at 35-36.
52.
See Ignacio Mas, Shifting Branchless Banking Regulation from Enabling to
Fostering Competition, 30 BANKiNG FIN. L. REV. 179, 185 (2015) (discussing the
principal-agent relationship between financial institutions and retail outlets).
53.
See id. at 185-86.
54.
See Maria C. Stephens, Promoting Responsible FinancialInclusion: A Risk
Based Approach to SupportingMobile FinancialServices Expansion, 27 BANKING FIN. L.
REV. 329, 333 (2012).
55.
Id.
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56
catastrophic impact on the mobile money system in a country. This
risk is compounded by the fact that regulators will be more likely to
focus their investigations on the few companies or institutions
dominating the market, which, as discussed below, could cause
participants to exit the industry.
Despite these risks, mobile money programs enable poor users to
access safe financial channels, and governments should put
substantial efforts and resources into promoting and expanding these
programs.

III. INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF MOBILE MONEY
Although many international governments realize the success of
mobile money programs and are attempting to promote financial
inclusion, many of the anti-money laundering policies developed to
safeguard the integrity of the financial system will have the likely
impact of hindering the growth and accessibility of safe mobile money
services. This dilemma is rooted in the world's anti-money laundering
laws and complicated by the fact that expanding financial services to
57
the world's poor is not a particularly profitable enterprise. This Part
will describe the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which guides
and assesses international anti-money laundering laws, and will set
forth the FATF Recommendations that are relevant to mobile money
transactions.
A. The FinancialAction Task Force (FATF)
The FATF was established in 1989 as a temporary
intergovernmental task force in response to the United Nations'
universal pledge to prevent money laundering. 5 8 Its development can
be traced to the United States' "War on Drugs," which brought money
laundering into the spotlight for the first time. 59 Due to the
international component of money laundering, the G7 nations, led by
the United States, created the FATF and quickly enacted a set of
common standards, known as the "40 Recommendations," which were
intended to be nonbinding benchmarks that governments could use to

56.
See id.
See Richard K. Gordon, Losing the War Against Dirty Money: Rethinking
57.
Global Standardson PreventingMoney Launderingand Terrorism Financing, 21 DUKE
J. COMiP. & INT'L L. 503, 505, 531 (2011) (discussing economic incentives, or lack thereof,
faced by private institutions for complying with anti-money laundering laws).
See Winn, supra note 28, at 210.
58.
See Ben Hayes, Counter-Terrorism, "Policy Laundering," and the FATF:
59.
Legalizing Surveillance, Regulating Civil Society, 14 INT'L J. NOT-FOR-PROFIT L. 5, 11
(2012).
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formulate national anti-money laundering legislation. 6 0 Following the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the FATF added eight (later
nine) Special Recommendations on Terrorism Financing. 6 1
Despite the fact that the FATF is only made up of thirty-six
members and remains an informal international organization today, it
has been extremely successful in guiding anti-money laundering
legislation and enforcement regimes across the world. Over 180
jurisdictions along with the United Nations, the World Bank, and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) endorse the FATF standards. 6 2
The FATF's success and influence stem from its dual system of
evaluation and enforcement. In 2002, the IMF, the World Bank, and
the FATF agreed to a uniform system of assessment, including selfassessment and mutual assessment, to determine whether individual
countries are adequately implementing the standards. 63 If a country
fails the assessment, it may be subject to broad sanctions or
countermeasures, such as a ban on states and external financial
institutions doing business with financial institutions located within
the assessed country. 64 This compliance system applies to both
member and non-member countries, and the threat of economic
penalties has led most countries to enact legislation in accordance with
the FATF Recommendations. 65
In the early 2000s, evidence emerged showing that vague rules
coupled with conservative regulators were impeding the growth of
innovative financial services. 66 In 2003, the FATF updated the
Recommendations to allow countries and financial institutions to apply
a risk-based approach to anti-money laundering frameworks. 67 Under
the risk-based approach, countries may exclude activity from antimoney laundering regulation where the activity poses a limited risk of
money laundering or terrorist financing.
Institutions were urged to consider adopting a [risk-based approach] in terms of
which customers, transactions, and services were divided into high-, standard-,
and low-risk bands. Enhanced due diligence was required in cases where a high
risk was identified. In cases where low risk was assessed, regulators could allow,
and institutions could consider employing, simplified due diligence measures. 6 8

60.
See id. at 12.
61.
See id.
62.
See Winn, supra note 28, at 210.
63.
Gordon, supra note 57, at 506.
64.
See id. at 506-07.
65.
See Louis de Koker, The 2012 Revised FATF Recommendations: Assessing
and Mitigating Mobile Money Integrity Risks Within the New Standards Framework, 8
WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 165, 168 (2015).
66.
See id. at 168-69.
67.
See id. at 169.
68.
See id. at 170.
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Due to ambiguity in the rules, countries feared the FATF would
disagree with a given risk assessment, so they decided not to apply
risk-based approaches. The FATF issued guidance on implementing an
adequate risk-based approach in 2007,69 but the guidance focused on
70
identifying high-risk scenarios as opposed to low-risk scenarios. In
2011, the FATF issued a guidance paper on financial inclusion that set
forth steps that countries could take to promote financial inclusion
71
while enforcing appropriate anti-money laundering (AML) policies.
Two years later, it published guidance meant to support the creation
of AML/CFT 72 measures that could meet the goal of increasing
financial inclusion while continuing to effectively combat money
73
And, more recently, the FATF
laundering and terrorist financing.
released a supplement that provides examples of countries' customer
due diligence (CDD) measures adapted to the context of financial
74
inclusion, with a specific focus on digital financial services.
B. FATF Recommendations Relevant to Mobile Money Networks
The FATF Recommendations distribute responsibility for
preventing money laundering and terrorist financing among the
private and public sectors. While the Recommendations have been
revised over time, the standards have always (1) required financial
institutions to engage in customer due diligence, monitor customer
transactions, and report suspicious activity to law enforcement, and (2)
required governments to enact adequate legislation, supervise
institutions, provide guidance regarding anti-money laundering and
counter-terrorist financing programs, and investigate reports of

FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, GUIDANCE ON THE RISK-BASED APPROACH TO
69.
COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING: HIGH LEVEL PRINCIPLES

AND PROCEDURES (June 2007), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/
reports/High%20Level%2OPrinciples%20and%2OProcedures.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3KLY-6XTS] (archived Sept. 5, 2018).
See de Koker, supra note 65, at 170.
70.
FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST
71.
FINANCING MEASURES AND FINANCIAL INCLUSION (June 2011), http://www.fatf2
gafi.org/media/fatf/content/images/AML%20CFT%20measures%20and%20financial% 0
inclusion.pdf [https://perma.cc/SK2G-Q7SN] (archived Aug. 5, 2018) [hereinafter FATF
ANTI-MONEY].
CFT stands for "combatting the financing of terrorism."
72.
FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, REVISED GUIDANCE ON AML/CFT MEASURES AND
73.
FINANCIAL INCLUSION (Feb. 2013), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/report
s/AMLCFTMeasures-andFinancialInclusion 2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7V8DMU
Y] (archived Sept. 5, 2018).
FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, FATF GUIDANCE ON AML/CFT MEASURES AND
74.
FINANCIAL INCLUSION, WITH A SUPPLEMENT ON CUSTOMER DUE DILIGENCE (Nov. 2017),
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/medialfatf/content/images/Updated-20 17-FATF-20 13Guidance.pdf [https://perma.cc/S32B-FVG7] (archived Sept. 5, 2018). [hereinafter 2017
FATF GUIDANCE].
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suspicious activity. 75 The primary objectives of the standards are to
prevent criminals from accessing the financial system, identify
criminals who have accessed the system, and open the flow of financial
information from the private to the public sector to assist in
investigations and prosecutions.76
The Recommendations applicable to the financial sector are
designed to require that financial institutions identify their customers,
gather information on an ongoing basis, create customer profiles,
monitor transactions to ensure they are in line with the customer
profiles, and report any suspicious activity that is not in line with the
customer profiles to law enforcement. 7 7 Recommendation 10 requires
that financial institutions identify and verify their customers'
identities using reliable and independent source documents, and
monitor their customers' transactions to ensure that the transactions
being conducted are consistent with each customer's business and risk
profile.7 8 Institutions are also required to identify the beneficial owner
of a customer and take reasonable measures to understand the
ownership and control structure of the customer.7 9 Recommendation
11 requires financial institutions to maintain transaction and account
records for a period of five years in order to provide transactional
information to law enforcement. 80 Financial institutions must
maintain ongoing customer due diligence programs and promptly
report any activity to a national financial intelligence unit that the
institution suspects or has reasonable grounds to suspect involves
funds that are the proceeds of a criminal activity or that are related to
terrorism financing. 8
It is important to note that financial institutions are required to
design and implement their own preventive measures systems. 8 2
While governments must establish guidelines and provide feedback to
assist financial institutions in this process, the Recommendations do
not specify how institutions should design or implement these systems.
Both countries and financial institutions are required to identify
and assess the money laundering and terrorist financing risks that
may arise in relation to the development of new products and business
practices, and the use of new or developing technologies for both new

75.
See, e.g., id.; Gordon, supra note 57, at 511.
76.
See Gordon, supra note 57, at 511 (discussing the main objectives of these
FATF Recommendations).
77.
See Model Regulation (2006) (on file with the U.N. Office on Drugs and
Crime); Gordon, supra note 57, at 511.
78.
FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 19, at 12.
79.
Id. For country examples of simplified customer due diligence requirements
regarding mobile money accounts, see 2017 FATF GUIDANCE, supra note 74, at 22.
80.
FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 19, at 12.
81.
Id. at 20.
82.
Id. at 18.
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and preexisting products. 83 There are various Recommendations
specifically addressing money or value transfer services (MVTS) that
84
Pursuant to Recommendation
apply to mobile money transactions.
14, providers of 1IVTS must be licensed or registered and subject to
effective systems for monitoring and ensuring compliance with the
relevant FATF measures. 85 Recommendation 16 requires financial
institutions to include originator information in wire transfer
messages and to continue monitoring wire transfers to ensure the
information remains with the transfer throughout the payment
chain.8 6 It also requires institutions to ensure they can take freezing
action or prevent prohibited transactions when required by UN
Security Council resolutions for the prevention and suppression of
87
terrorism and terrorist financing. Recommendation 17 does allow a
financial institution to rely on third parties to perform customer due
diligence, provided that certain requirements are met, but the financial
88
institution maintains accountability for actions of its agents.
Recommendations 26 to 35 address the responsibilities of
government and law enforcement. Recommendations 26 and 27 require
countries to ensure that financial institutions are subject to adequate
regulation and supervision and are effectively implementing the FATF
Recommendations; that financial institutions are licensed or
registered; and that supervisors have adequate powers to supervise,
89
Included
monitor, and ensure compliance by financial institutions.
in the supervisors' powers must be the power to compel production of
"any information . . . that is relevant to monitoring such compliance,
90
and to impose sanctions" for failure to comply. Recommendation 29
requires countries to establish a Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) that
receives, analyzes, and disseminates suspicious transaction reports
and other information regarding potential money laundering or
terrorist financing. FIUs must also have access on a timely basis to the
financial, administrative, and law enforcement information that they
require to undertake their functions. 91 Countries must grant law

Id. at 15.
83.
De Koker, supra note 65, at 178. An MVTS is defined as a financial service
84.
that involves the acceptance of cash, checks, other monetary instruments, or other stores
of value, and the payment of a corresponding sum in cash or other form to a beneficiary
by means of a communication, message, transfer, or through a clearing network to which
the MVTS provider belongs.
FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 19, at 14.
85.
Id. at 16.
86.
Id.
87.
See 2017 FATF GUIDANCE, supra note 74, at 23. This is particularly relevant
88.
to the mobile money context due to the participation of agents in mobile money
transactions.
Id. at 27; FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 19, at 26.
89.
FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 19, at 26.
90.
Id. at 29.
91.
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enforcement authorities the ability to undertake money laundering
and terrorist financing investigations, including the authority to access
records kept by financial institutions, and must require law
enforcement to appropriately conduct these investigations. 92 Last,
countries must ensure there are a "range of effective, proportionate and
dissuasive sanctions, whether criminal, civil or administrative,
available to deal with" persons that fail to comply with anti-money
laundering and counter-terrorist financing requirements.9
The FATF 2017 Guidance recognizes that "applying an overly
cautious, non-risk-based approach to AML/CFT safeguards when
providing financial services ... can have the unintended consequence
of excluding legitimate consumers and businesses from the regulated
financial system." 94 It therefore encourages countries, in certain
lower-risk situations, to implement simplified customer due diligence
measures and apply a risk-based approach to support access to basic
financial services for unbanked and underbanked persons. 95

IV. LESSONS FROM THE UNITED STATES: THE IMPACT OF RESTRICTIVE
ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING REGULATIONS AND ENFORCEMENT ON
MONEY-SERVICE BUSINESSES

Money-Service Businesses (MSBs) are nonbank institutions that
provide a myriad of financial services, often to unbanked and
underbanked populations. 96 They include currency dealers or
exchangers, check cashers, money order and traveler's check issuers,
and

money transmitters. 97 The

Financial

Crimes

Enforcement

Network (FinCEN) recognizes that "MSBs play an important role in a
transparent financial system, particularly because they often provide
financial services to people less likely to use traditional banking
services and because of their prominent role in providing remittance
services." 98 Nevertheless, legislative and enforcement actions over the
past decade have resulted in financial institutions refusing to bank
MSBs in the United States, causing them to go out of business. If
international governments establish and implement anti-money
laundering laws consistent with the FATF Recommendations, there is
a strong possibility that international financial institutions will

92.
Id. at 30-31.
93.
Id. at 35.
94.
2017 FATF GUIDANCE, supra note 74, at 4.
95.
Id.
96.
FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, STATEMENT ON PROVIDING BANKING
SERVICES
TO
MONEY
SERVICES
BuSINESSES
(Nov.
10,
2014),
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/news-release/20141110.pdf [https://perma.cc/
GUS2-7NRC] (archived Sept. 5, 2018) [hereinafter 2014 FINCEN STATEMENT].
97.
Id.
98.
Id.
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similarly refuse to participate in mobile money transactions, since they
will face the same types of issues that caused US financial institutions
to terminate their MSB relationships.
This Part will provide a brief overview of US anti-money
laundering laws, demonstrate the similarity between US anti-money
laundering laws and the FATF Recommendations, and show how
enforcement of US anti-money laundering laws caused financial
institutions to terminate their relationships with MSBs, ultimately
causing vulnerable populations to lose access to financial services and
sending financial transactions underground.
A. The United States'Anti-Money LaunderingRegime
The United States' anti-money laundering laws, in accordance
with the FATF Recommendations, require covered institutions to
comply with customer due diligence (which includes identifying and
verifying the customer and monitoring customer activity), recordkeeping, and suspicious activity reporting requirements. 9 Covered
institutions include, among others, depository institutions, securities
and futures industries, money-service businesses, and casinos. 100
Congress first enacted the Currency and Foreign Transactions
Reporting Act, commonly referred to as the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), in
1970.101 The BSA has been amended and supplemented numerous
times over the years as the government has intensified its focus on
money laundering due to its connection first with drug trafficking and
1 02
The initial goal of the BSA was to
subsequently with terrorism.
laundering by requiring financial
money
prevent
detect, deter, and
in excess of $10,000 and
transactions
cash
institutions to report
10 3
maintain records of financial transactions.
In 1992, Congress enacted the Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money
Laundering Act, which required covered institutions to file suspicious
activity reports (SARs) detailing transactions identified as suspicious

Over time, the United States has updated and amended its anti-money
99.
laundering laws in response to the FATF Recommendations. See History of Anti-Money
NETWORK,
ENFORCEMENT
CRIMES
FIN.
Laws,
Laundering
https://www.fincen.gov/history-anti-money-laundering-laws (last visited Sept. 5, 2018)
[https://perma.cclS7YA-SCBU] (archived Aug. 5, 2018) [hereinafter FinCEN AntiMoney]. It underwent the mutual evaluation processes in 2005-06 and 2015-16, and the
Treasury has been responsible for improving anti-money laundering systems deemed
non-compliant. See FATF ANTI-MONEY, supra note 71.
100. See FinCEN Anti-Money, supranote 99.
101. Currency and Foreign Transactions Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat.
1114 [hereinafter Bank Secrecy Act] (codified as amended in scattered sections of 31
U.S.C.).
102. See FinCEN Anti-Money, supra note 99 (including a history of U.S. antimoney laundering laws).
103. See id. (describing the goals of the anti-money laundering laws).
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with FinCEN. 104 FinCEN was created by the Treasury and is
primarily responsible for enforcing BSA regulations, though a variety
of other government agencies and actors have become involved in antimoney laundering enforcement over the years. 10 5 A covered institution
must file a SAR if it knows, suspects, or has reason to know or suspect
that a transaction involves a financial crime or has no business
purpose. 106 The information contained in SARs is vital to law
enforcement efforts to combat money laundering and other financial
crimes, and SARs are often used as a starting point for federal
investigations into these crimes. In order to encourage institutions to
assist the government in curtailing financial crimes, Congress added a
safe harbor provision to the Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering
Act that provides immunity to a reporter for civil liability arising from
a SAR. 0 7 However, courts are split on whether this grant of immunity
is absolute or qualified based on the reporter having a "good faith
basis" for filing the SAR. 0 8
In 1994, Congress passed the Money Laundering Suppression Act,
which requires MSBs to register with FinCEN.1 0 9 MSBs are defined
as entities that accept or transmit money; they are subject to SAR
reporting requirements; and they must maintain detailed financial
records and implement anti-money laundering programs. 1 10
Federal anti-money laundering laws were enhanced significantly
following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The US
government determined that some of the hijackers received a total of
$110,000 that originated in a United Arab Emirates bank and was sent

&

104. Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act, Title XV, Pub. L. No. 102-550,
106 Stat. 4044 (1992) (12 U.S.C. § 1811); see also FinCEN Anti-Money, supra note 99.
105. See Cynthia J. Larose, InternationalMoney LaunderingAbatement andAntiTerrorism FinancingAct of 2001, 30 J.C. & U.L. 417, 418 n.6 (2004) ("The FinCEN was
created by administrative order in 1990 to provide other government agencies with an
'intelligence and analytical' network in support of the detection, investigation and
prosecution on domestic and international money laundering and other crimes.") The
PATRIOT Act gives FinCEN statutory life as a bureau within the Department of the
Treasury. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 10756, 115 Stat. 272 [hereinafter PATRIOT Act].
106. 12 C.F.R. § 353.3(b) (2017).
107. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(3) (2012).
108. See Frank A. Mayer, III & Chad B. Holtzman, The Need for Absolute
Immunity When an Institution Submits a Suspicious Activity Report, 32(2) BANKING
FIN. SERVS. POL'Y REP., Feb. 2014, at 14.
109. See FinCEN Anti-Money, supra note 99 (listing requirements of the Money
Laundering Suppression Act).
110. See M. MacRae Robinson, Easing the Burden on Mobile Payments: Resolving
CurrentDeficiencies in Money Transmitter Regulation, 18 N.C. BANKING INST. 553, 55456 (2014) (describing the characteristics of MSBs).
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to Florida Sun Trust Bank through formal financial channels. il
Although the largest transaction of $69,000 was flagged as suspicious
by the bank's anti-money laundering controls, the report was lost in
the myriad of SARs that were generated by banks prior to the
attacks.1 1 2
In response to the attacks, Congress enacted the USA PATRIOT
Act, which made several additions to the BSA and enhanced the role of
the Treasury and FinCEN. 1 13 The primary goal of the PATRIOT Act
was to track and prevent transactions before they reached terrorists.
Congress sought to achieve this goal by forcing transfers into formal
channels and by tightening requirements on financial institutions to
monitor those transfers. 114 The PATRIOT Act requires financial
institutions to develop and implement an anti-money laundering
program that establishes internal policies, procedures, and controls, a
compliance officer, an ongoing employee-training program, and an
15
independent audit function to test the program.1 The PATRIOT Act
also requires financial institutions to undertake additional customer
due diligence, which includes customer identification procedures
(institutions must verify a customer's name, birthdate, address, and
identification number) prior to opening an account. 116 A new rule
effective in May 2018 strengthened customer due diligence
requirements on financial institutions by requiring them to identify
and verify the beneficial owners of accounts, and maintain records on
117
these beneficial owners.
Federal anti-money laundering laws also focus on correspondent
banking, which occurs where a financial institution carries out
transactions on another institution's behalf. Due to the risk inherent
in correspondent banking, financial institutions must also conduct due
diligence on all non-US entities (such as foreign financial institutions)
for which they maintain correspondent accounts. 118 Since 2006,

111. Bryan Mulcahey, A Lose-Lose Scenario When the Federal Governments Starts
a Theory with "Too Big". How the DOJ's AML Enforcement Policy Forces Remittances
Underground, 6 GEO. MASON J. INT'L COM. L. 107, 116 (2014).
112. Id. at 116-17.
113. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 10756, 115 Stat. 272.
114. See Mulcahey, supra note 111, at 117 (describing the main goal of antiterrorism legislation after September 11, 2001).
115. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311, 5318 (2012).
116. 31 U.S.C. § 5318 (2012).
117. See FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS
REGARDING CUSTOMER DUE DILIGENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
(2016). https://www.ffiec.gov/bsa-aml-infobase/documents/FAQs-forCDD FinalRule
(7_15_16).pdf [https://perma.cc/V86V-LDN8] (archived Aug. 5, 2018).
118. See 31 U.S.C. § 5318(i)(1) (2012); see also SEC, HSBC Deferred Prosecution
Agreement Attachment A, http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/hsbc/dpa-attachmenta.pdf (filed Dec. 11, 2012) [https://perma.cc/3HQ4-Q5S9] (archived Aug. 5, 2018)
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financial institutions have monitored wire transfers to and from
correspondent accounts using automated systems to track suspicious
activity and are required to report suspicious activity to FinCEN.1 1 9
In addition, following the September 11 attacks, the Office of
Foreign Assets and Control (OFAC) began to strictly enforce
regulations and sanctions aimed at preventing transactions with
persons or entities that could threaten national security.1 2 0 Money
transmission businesses are required to screen transactions to
determine whether the sender or recipient of funds is listed on OFAC's
Specially Designated National or Blocked Person (SDN) List, which
identifies individuals and companies that may be connected with
terrorism or drug trafficking.121
As shown in the chart in Appendix A, US anti-money laundering
laws closely align with the FATF Recommendations.
B. History of Enforcement & Result
In 1997, over two hundred thousand MSBs operated in the United
States, providing financial services estimated at $200 billion
annually.1 2 2 Over the past decade, strict enforcement of anti-money
laundering laws by regulators coupled with numerous government
investigations and massive settlement payments have caused banks to
terminate their relationships with most MSBs. This has occurred
notwithstanding the government continuously issuing policies and
statements aimed at encouraging banks to continue banking MSB
clients due to their critical role in providing financial services to
unbanked and underbanked populations.
The US government began recognizing the adverse impact that an
overly-conservative anti-money laundering regime could have on the
MSB industry in early 2005. JP Morgan Chase and North Fork Bank,

[hereinafter SEC HSBC] (noting that correspondent accounts are high risk because the
bank lacks a direct relationship with the customer that initiated the wire transfer).
119. See SEC HSBC, supra note 118.
120. See CounterterrorInitiatives in the Terror Finance Program,Focusing on the
Role of the Anti-Money Laundering Regulatory Regime in the Financial War on
Terrorism, Better Utilization of Technology, Increased Information Sharing, Developing
Similar InternationalStandards, and the Formation of Terrorist FinancingOperations
Section (TFOS) Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 108th Cong.
193 (2004) (statement of R. Richard Newcomb, Director, Office of Foreign Assets
Control).
121. See Office of Foreign Assets Control-Sanctions Program and Information,
U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREAsURY (July 23, 2018), https://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/sanctions/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/S2UTM-TJ3R] (archived Aug. 5,
2018).
122. Bank Secrecy Act's Impact on Money Services Businesses: HearingBefore the
Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit of the Committee on
FinancialServices, US House of Representatives, 109th Cong. 11-12 (2006) (statement
of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency).

2018]

THE GROWTH OF MOBILE MONEY

1131

which were among the last banks still providing account services to
MSBs, notified about twenty money transmittal businesses with
hundreds of outlets in grocery stores and travel agencies that their
bank accounts would be closed by the end of March 2005.123 On March
8, 2005, FinCEN led a fact-finding meeting to identify the reasons that
MSBs were unable to access banking services. 1 24 At the meeting, MSB
participants noted that hundreds of MSBs had lost their banking
privileges and banks noted the difficulty in separating suspicious
activity from legitimate businesses. 125 Bank representatives
explained that they could not afford the high costs of doing in-depth
due diligence in an area of business deemed "risky" and that they
wanted to avoid the regulatory scrutiny that seemed to occur whenever
12 6
they provided banking services to MSBs.
FinCEN recognized that the inevitable result of shutting down
MSB accounts would be to drive those looking for banking services to
illegal operations. 127 On March 30, 2005, FinCEN, along with the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC), the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), and the
National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), issued a joint
statement to address their expectations regarding banks' obligations
12 8
The Joint Statement noted that MSBs
under the BSA for MSBs.
"are losing access to banking services as a result of concerns about
regulatory scrutiny, the risks presented by money services business
accounts, and the costs and burdens associated with maintaining such
accounts," and it said the concerns stem, in part, "from a misperception
of the requirements" of the BSA. 129 In particular, there is an
"erroneous view that money services businesses present a uniform and
unacceptably high risk of money laundering or other illicit activity. The
Money services business industry provides valuable financial services,

123. See Nina Bernstein, Antiterror Efforts Squeeze Money Transfer Operations,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2005) ("[B]ecause of pressure from federal banking regulators, one
bank after another has rejected its money transmittal customers unfairly lumping
together licensed, reputable businesses and risky, illegal operations, mainly to eliminate
the risk of an oversight and bad publicity.").
124. See generally An Update on Money Services Businesses Under Bank Secrecy
and USA PATRIOT Regulation:HearingBefore the Committee on Banking, Housingand
UrbanAffairs, 109th Cong. (2005) [hereinafter Update on MSBs].
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. Id.
128.
BANKING

FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, JOINT STATEMENT ON PROVIDING
SERVICES
TO
MONEY
SERVICE
BUSINESSES
(Mar.
30,
2005),

https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/guidance/bsamsbrevisedstatement.pdf [https://
perma.cc/83MF-NCFC]
(archived Sept. 5, 2018).
129. Id.
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especially to individuals who may not have ready access to the formal
banking sector."1 3 0 In addition,
the [BSA] does not require . . . banking institutions to serve as the de facto
regulator of the money service business industry. Banking organizations that
open or maintain accounts for money-service businesses should apply the
requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act on a risk-assessed basis, as they do for all
customers, taking into account the products and services offered and the
13 1
individual circumstances.

The banking agencies subsequently released interagency
guidance that set forth the minimum steps that financial institutions
should take when banking MSBs. 13 2 The guidance covered minimum
BSA due diligence expectations, BSAlanti-money laundering risk
assessments,
due diligence for higher-risk customers, and
identification and reporting of suspicious activity. 1 33 On May 26, 2005,
the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee
on Financial Services in the U.S. House of Representatives held a
hearing where the banking agencies again encouraged banks to
provide account services to MSBs. 134
Although it was clear that the banking agencies wanted banks to
provide financial services to MSBs, banks were still required to
determine for themselves what constituted reasonable due diligence
and suspicious activity, and uncertainty remained regarding whether
banks' views on these issues would align with.regulators'. At the May
26 hearing, the Director of the American Bankers' Association (ABA)
testified that it was on the direction of regulators that banks were
exiting the MSB industry: "I must take issue with my friend ... who
said it was a misperception on the part of the banking industry. It was
no misperception, it was comments from field examiners who told us to
eliminate these accounts because they were in fact high risk." 13 5 The

130.
131.

Id.
Id.

132.

FIN.

CRIMES

ENFORCEMENT

NETWORK,

INTERAGENCY

INTERPRETIVE

GUIDANCE ON PROVIDING BANKING SERVICES TO MONEY SERVICES BUSINESSES
OPERATING
IN
THE
UNITED
STATES
(Apr.
26,
2005),
https://www.fmcen.gov/sites/default/files/guidance/guidance04262005.pdf [https://perm
a.cclU88G-GUBQ] (archived Sept. 5, 2018).
133. Id.
134. See generally The First Line of Defense: The Role of FinancialInstitutions in
Detecting Financial Crimes: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 109th Cong. (2005) (noting that the
purpose of the BSA is to improve financial integrity by utilizing formal financial channels
to gather information and prosecute criminals).
135. See id. at 34, 38 ("The check cashing and MSB industry suffers greatly from
the perception that we are inordinately high-risk as compared with other financial
institutions or businesses. It would appear that this conclusion has been reached by
Federal bank examiners and adopted unfortunately by banks with little attention to the
actual compliance record.").

THE GROWTH OF MOBILE MONEY

2018]

1133

Director of the ABA also noted that there was a 40 percent increase in
SAR filings over the past year. 1 36 He attributed this phenomenon to
regulatory scrutiny of SAR filings rather than increased criminal
7

activity.' 3
Notwithstanding the interagency guidance and encouragement
from the government, banks remained skeptical as to whether their
anti-money laundering systems would comply with the BSA, and MSBs
found it even more difficult to gain access to banking services. In the
year following the May 26 hearing, three national banks stopped
offering services to MSBs and the U.S. House of Representatives held
138
another hearing on June 21, 2006 to address the issue.
Representatives from the industry explained that the regulatory
scrutiny that accompanies MSB accounts alters banks' cost-benefit
analysis of providing services to MSBs and forces banks to either
39
increase fees or exit lines of business.1 Banks across the board were
making the decision to invest their resources in more profitable and
140
For
less-risky lines of business, causing a "state of crisis" for MSBs.
instance, only two banks were serving check cashers and money
remitters at the time of the hearing, meaning there would be a
catastrophic impact on the industry if one or both were to exit either
business. 141 And money remitters were losing access to banking
services because regulators deemed remitters "high risk," even though
the average remittance was only $243. 142 The National Money
Transmitters' Association noted that
[the government's] attempts to protect the banking system from the risk [money
remitters] pose have backfired badly by threatening to destroy the best ally law
enforcement has in the fight against money laundering.. . . Although regulators
say that they do not hold banks responsible for our supervision, that is exactly
what is happening. Under such conditions, it does not make sense for any bank
to keep us as a customer.

1 43

Over the next several years, despite the government's insistence
that MSBs did not pose a high risk of money laundering and that

136. Id. at 35.
137. Id. (testifying that the number of SARs filed will continue to skyrocket if the
regulators continue to "second guess SAR decisions made by the financial sector").
138. See generallyBank Secrecy Act's Impact on Money Services Business: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Inst. and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.,
109th Cong. (2006).
139. See id. at 41.
140. See id. at 39.
141. See id. (likening the label of MSB to a scarlet letter).
142. See id. at 37 (listing seven national banks that terminated their relationship
with MoneyGram, including Bank of America two months before the hearing), 42, and
142 (noting that hundreds of agents' accounts were terminated in the past 18 months,
and most businesses being closed are minority-owned and used businesses in poor
neighborhoods).
143. See id. at 42.
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financial institutions were not required to be the de facto regulator of
MSB clients, 14 4 the government significantly intensified its focus on
anti-money laundering controls at banks and regulatory concerns
caused even more banks to terminate MSB clients. By 2012, sanctions
for anti-money laundering violations totaled $3.5 billion, up from $26
million in 2011, and the Treasury and the OCC defended their hardline
stance against financial institution anti-money laundering failures at
a hearing before the Senate in March 2013.145 And, in 2013, the
Department of Justice (DOJ) launched its disastrous Operation
Chokepoint.
Operation Chokepoint was ostensibly created to target massmarket consumer fraud by preventing "access to the banking system
by the many fraudulent merchants who had come to rely on the
conscious assistance of banks and processors in facilitating their
schemes." 146 In connection with Operation Chokepoint, the FDIC
released a list of thirty lines of business deemed "high risk" and the
DOJ issued over fifty administrative subpoenas to banks and thirdparty payment processors. In response to the subpoenas and the
declaration that certain businesses were "high risk," banks began
terminating their account relationships with the targeted businesses,
especially short-term lenders, even though the businesses were
operating legally and providing financial services to people without
access to traditional banking services. 1 4 7 The FDIC rescinded their list
of "high risk" businesses and the House Oversight and Government

144. See generally Regulation of Money Services Businesses: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Fin. Inst. and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong.
(2010); see also generally Patternsof Abuse: Assessing Bank Secrecy Act Compliance and
Enforcement: HearingBefore the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and UrbanAff, 113th
Cong. (2013) [hereinafter Patternsof Abuse].
145. See Patterns of Abuse, supra note 144, at 31 ("A truly robust anti-money
laundering framework . . . requires effective anti-money laundering/CFT program
implementation by financial institutions, buttressed by strong enforcement efforts when
those efforts fall short of the mark. When anti-money laundering/CFT safeguards are
not effectively implemented and compliance lags, money launderers, terrorist financiers,
and other illicit actors freely abuse our financial system. . . . [A] secure global framework
is essential to the integrity of the U.S. financial system . . . we engage several
intergovernmental and international organizations . . . to develop, assess and facilitate
implementation of effective anti-money laundering/CFT laws around the world."); OCC
Statement (noting that OCC regulators make use of both formal and informal
enforcement actions and that "[in some cases, banks ceased engaging in a particular
line of business as a result of the OCC examination . .. and the OCC article required
approval should the bank decide to restart that particular line of business or service").
146. HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Reg. Reform, Commercialand Antitrust Law
of the H. Comm. on Judiciary, 113th Cong. 2 (2014) (statement of Stuart F. Delery,
Assistant Att'y Gen., Civil Div.).
147. See Ruth Ravve, Congress launching hearings on complaints businesses
targeted by "Operation Choke Point", FOX NEWS POLITICS (Mar. 24, 2015),
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2015/03/24/congress-launching-hearings-oncomplaints-businesses-targeted-by-operation.html
[https://perma.cc/XZ5H-RQ7Q]
(archived Aug. 3, 2018).
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Reform Committee initiated an investigation of the Operation, but by
that time the damage had been done.
By shutting down the bank accounts of these legally operating businesses, what
they're actually doing is forcing these businesses to deal solely in cash, which is
completely opposite of what they have said their intention is . . . It's a whole lot
easier to launder money with cash than having to go through a financial
institution.

14 8

The House Committee's investigation found that Operation
Chokepoint forced banks to terminate relationships with a wide variety
of lawful merchants simply because the government deemed the
business lines "high risk," not because actual fraud or money
14 9
In November 2014, FinCEN released
laundering was discovered.
yet another statement encouraging banks to provide account services
150
The statement noted
to MSBs by employing a risk-based approach.
that "MSBs play an important role in a transparent financial system,
particularly because they often provide financial services to people less
likely to use traditional banking services and because of their
15 1
prominent role in providing remittance services."
Due to enhanced scrutiny from regulators and the potential for
large fines if banks make a compliance-related mistake, banks have
decided not to work with businesses they deem to be high risk,
including MSBs. FinCEN continues to encourage banks to provide
account services to MSBs and expects banks to take a risk-based
approach in assessing customer relationships rather than exiting
entire lines of business-an approach known as "de-risking"-but the
risk of banking businesses that may be high risk is simply not worth
the compliance cost to banks. Ironically, the "result of de-risking is rerisking," since bad actors will leave cautious banks and turn to
15 2
As the managing director
institutions unequipped to handle them.
for financial crimes enforcement at JP Morgan Chase explained, "[w]e
are kind of in a Ping-Pong match between financial inclusion and
153
avoiding regulatory scrutiny and we are the ball."

148.
149.
150.

Id.
Id.
FinCEN Statement on Providing Banking Services to Money Service

Businesses,

FIN.

CRIMES

ENFORCEMENT

NETWORK

(Nov.

10,

2014),

[https://perma.cc[PWM8-87ZB]
https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/statement
(archived Aug. 3, 2018).
151. Id.
152. Ian McKendry, Banks Face No Win Scenario on AML 'De-Risking,AMERICAN
BANKER (Nov. 17, 2014), https://www.americanbanker.com/newsbanks-face-no-winscenario-on-aml-de-risking [https://perma.cc/A2ET-XMYE] (archived Aug. 3, 2018).
153. Id.
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C. ConservativeApproach to Mobile Money Anti-Money Laundering
Regulations Already Being Felt around the World
In contrast to the rapid growth of mobile money services in
developing parts of the world, mobile money has not enhanced financial
inclusion in the United States. This is likely due, at least in part, to the
fact that banks are prohibited from settling financial transactions for
customers without performing customer due diligence and applying
know-your-customer (KYC) procedures. Regulatory agencies have
taken the position that the BSA's anti-money laundering regulations
apply to banks engaged in mobile money transactions, and the former
FinCEN director specifically stated that the revised FATF
Recommendations will apply to financial institutions that use "new
technologies" to provide financial services. 15 4 In the United States,
mobile banking generally consists of bank account holders using a
smartphone to make a transaction or check their account; mobile
banking is not used to provide financial access to the unbanked or
underbanked. 15 5 An estimated 7 percent of US households lack access
to a bank account and an additional 19.9 percent have a bank account
but still use an alternative financial service at least once per year, and
are thus classified as "underbanked." 1 5 6 These populations continue to
make use of alternative financial services, such as check cashers,
payday lenders, and money orders (all MSBs), and have to incur the
high fees associated with the use of these services. 15 7 While most of
the unbanked population has access to a mobile phone in the United
States, mobile banking services are not aimed at providing services to
the underserved.1 5 8
Although many developing countries that employ a robust mobile
money network are still in the process of establishing anti-money
laundering laws that comply with the FATF standards, consequences

154. See Mulcahey, supra note 111, at 107.
155. See Erin F. Font6, Mobile Payments in the United States: How
DisintermediationMay Affect Delivery of Payment Functions, FinancialInclusion and
Antimoney Laundering Issues, 8 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 419, 445 (2013) ("Mobile
payments in the United States are currently about affluence and advertising, not access
. . . Other countries, including developed and developing nations, have outpaced the
United States in mobile payments adoption.").
156. See 2015 FDIC National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households,
FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. (June 29, 2017), https://www.fdic.gov/householdsurvey/
[https://perma.cclAK8Z-UGET] (archived Aug. 3, 2018).
157. In his TED talk, economist Dilip Ratha explains that money transfer services
"structure their fees to milk the poor," though the CEO of Western Union posits that
anti-money laundering compliance costs coupled with the difficult barriers to entry into
the market lead to the high fees for remittances. See Ben Schiller, The Fight For The
$400 Billion Business Of Immigrants Sending Money Home, FAST COMPANY (Apr. 28,
2017), https://www.fastcompany.com/3067778/the-blockchain-is-going-to-save-immigra
nts-millions-in-remittance-fees [https://perma.cclB48G-P9DL] (archived Aug. 3, 2018).
158. See Font6, supra note 155, at 449.
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of the anti-money laundering regime and the policies behind the
standards can already be seen. For instance, an analysis undertaken
by the FATF to assess the impact of countries' AML/CFT regimes on
financial inclusion found that customer due diligence requirements
were too stringent in certain countries. 15 9 In Zambia, Tanzania, and
Bangladesh, for example, the strict requirements "were impeding
160
The
access of certain low risk categories of customers to finance."
FATF also found that lower capacity countries in particular have been
having difficulty striking a balance between financial inclusion and
61
It reported that "[i]n one
customer due diligence requirements.1
country, although the financial sector was very interested in offering
financial inclusion products with simplified CDD, their requests for
reconsideration of the stringent CDD framework of the country were
16 2
dismissed by the authorities."
In Kenya, for example, the Central Bank of Kenya has said that
BitPesa, a remittance service, does not comply with the bank's money
transmission and remittance regulations. 163 As a result, the
company's telecom service, Safaricom, terminated its relationship with
BitPesa, even though the company claims that its policies do comply

with the country's anti-money laundering regulations.1 64 In addition,
16 5
the U.S. State Department alleged that
in a March 2017 Report,
Kenya's M-PESA system (among other international systems), which
has thirty million subscribers and has been credited with bringing 2
percent of Kenyan households out of extreme poverty, remains

159. See 2017 FATF GUIDANCE, supranote 74, at 26.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 29.
162. Id.
163. See Lester Coleman, Telecom/BitPesa Legal Tangle Over AML Threatens
Mobile Payments in Kenya, CCN (Dec. 1, 2015), https://www.ccn.com/telecombitpesa[https://perma.cclXC8V-ZG6N]
legal-tangle-aml-threatens-mobile-payments-kenyal
(archived Aug. 3, 2018).
164. See Ian Allison, Bitcoin versus M-Pesa: Digitalpayments rumble in the jungle,
INT'L BUS. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2015), https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/bitcoin-versus-m-pesadigital-payments-rumble-jungle- 1531208 [https://perma.cc/3ZH7-BGPF] (archived Aug.
3, 2018) ("BitPesa has implemented anti-money laundering/KYC policies that comply
with Kenyan legal and regulatory requirements. We have freely submitted them to the
Central Bank of Kenya, as well as regulators in other jurisdictions in which we operate.
We hold ourselves to the highest standards when it comes to anti-money laundering/KYC
compliance."). The chief legal and compliance officer of BitPesa says the company
"continues to work with Kenya's central bank" and asserts that, in order for regulations
to stop stifling technological innovation in the country, "regulators could work with
innovators to see how the technology applies in order to create legislation or engagement
rules." Lester Coleman, BitPesa:Regulators'Disconnectwith Blockchain Firms Hurting
Innovation in Kenya, CCN (Dec. 24, 2016), https://www.cen.com/bitpesa-regulatorsdisconnect-blockchain-firms-hurting-innovation-kenyal [https://perma.cc/AVC2-M5PY]
(archived Aug. 3, 2018).
165. BUREAU FOR INT'L NARCOTICS & LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT, VOL. II 116 (2017).
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vulnerable to money laundering.1 6 6 It remains to be seen what impact,
if any, this allegation will have on financial institutions' involvement
in M-PESA transactions.

V. ENTER THE GATEKEEPERS: A PROPOSAL TO PREVENT ANTI-MONEY
LAUNDERING POLICIES FROM HINDERING THE SUCCESSFUL GROWTH OF
MOBILE MONEY PROGRAMS

A. What Went Wrong?
As discussed above, in response to anti-money laundering policies
and enforcement actions against financial institutions, US banks have
terminated their relationships with MSBs.
If international
governments establish and strictly enforce anti-money laundering
laws based on the FATF Recommendations, financial institutions may
ultimately refuse to participate in mobile money transactions as well.
In order to prevent this from occurring, the international community
can look to gatekeeper theory and create a regime that incentivizes
financial institutions to remain in the industry. In particular, an
optimal liability regime should replace the current liability regime,
governments should employ incentives to encourage financial
institutions to settle mobile money transactions, and financial
institutions should be enabled and encouraged to build reputational
capital in the field.
1. Gatekeeper Theory
The gatekeeper theory of liability imposes liability on
professionals for wrongs committed by their clients. Under traditional
gatekeeper theory, a gatekeeper is an intermediary party with the
capacity to monitor and influence the conduct of its client. 167
Gatekeepers are generally retained as agents to perform a service for
a principal and through their role they are granted access to
information that puts them in a unique position to evaluate whether

166. See Amy Westervelt, In The Rush Toward A Cashless Society, The PoorestAre
At
Risk
Of Further Exclusion, HUFFINGTON POST
(Feb.
16,
2018),
https://www.huffingtonpost.comlentry/cashless-society-poor-exclusion-us-5a857082e4b
Oab6daf463c4a [https://perma.ccl8W88-7ZKN] (archived Aug. 3, 2018).
167. See generally Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a ThirdParty Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. EcON. & ORG. 53 (1986); see also JOHN C. COFFEE,
JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2 (2006) ("First, the
gatekeeper may be a professional who is positioned so as to be able to prevent
wrongdoing by withholding necessary cooperation or consent. For example, an
investment banking firm can refuse to underwrite the issuer's securities if it finds that
the issuer's disclosures are materially deficient. . .. [A] second and superior definition of
the gatekeeper is an agent who acts as a reputational intermediary to assure investors
as to the quality of the 'signal' sent by the corporate issuer.").
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the principal has violated or may violate the law. 168 Gatekeepers
acquire reputational capital over many years that they pledge to
ensure the accuracy of their representations, and a gatekeeper would
not rationally risk losing its reputational capital for a single client or
fee.
In the capital markets, where gatekeeper theory has been applied
and incorporated into the law for many years, gatekeepers include
accountants who certify that a corporation's financial statements
comply with generally accepted accounting principles; lawyers who
ensure that a corporation submits accurate and required financial
make
and
evaluate
who
analysts
securities
disclosures;
recommendations regarding the value of securities; underwriters who
review and investigate a company before a securities offering; and
credit rating agencies who rate a corporation's securities. 169
Gatekeeper theory has been applied more broadly as well to refer to
any informational intermediary who provides verification or
certification services. 17 0 For instance, Underwriters Laboratories, Inc.
(UJL) is a nonprofit organization that tests various appliances and
generates labels for approved products, certifying to the public that the
Safety and Health
product is safe. 171 The Occupational
independent testing
an
as
UL
Administration (OSHA) has authorized
and the UL
procedures,
OSHA
and certifying organization for certain
1 72
mark now appears on twenty billion products each year.
Similarly,
private certification standards exist for food (OECD), education, and
healthcare facilities, among others. While gatekeepers take many
forms, a successful gatekeeper model tends to require the same basic
elements.
173
Without the
First, there must be a metaphorical gate to keep.
gatekeeper's permission, which can be manifested in a variety of ways,
an entity is unable to access the market. Sometimes, the gatekeeper's
role will be required by law before the client can access a market or
complete a transaction: an attorney or an auditor can refuse to deliver
an opinion that is necessary for a transaction to close based on
discrepancies in the corporation's financial statements or disclosures.
Other times, an enterprise will simply be unable to enter a market

168.

See Kraakman, supra note 167, at 54.

169.

See COFFEE, supra note 167.

170. See generally Frank Partnoy, Second-OrderBenefits from Standards, 48 B.C.
L. REV. 169 (2007) (discussing private actors who sell regulatory licenses that enable
market participants to reduce their costs).
171. See id. at 184.
172. See UNDERWRITERS LABS., THE UL SAFETY MARK: ON TIME MARKET ACCESS
TO NORTH AMERICA AND BEYOND (2012), https://uk.ul.com/wpcontent/uploads/sites/21/20

14/05/298.ULSafetyMarkENP.pdf [https://perma.cc/SDT4-DXKA] (archived Aug. 3,
2018).
173. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Beyond Liability; Rewarding Effective
Gatekeepers, 92 MINN. L. REV. 323, 334 (2007); see also COFFEE, supra note 167.
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without gatekeeper verification: an investment bank can prevent an
enterprise from entering the capital markets by refusing to underwrite
the issuer's securities. Under either scenario, the gatekeeper is an
intermediary with the power to prohibit an entity from accessing a
market.
Second, the gatekeeper must be able to monitor its client and
assert influence over its client's actions, thereby deterring wrongdoing.
A critical component of the gatekeeper's ability to exercise control over
its client is through its role in resolving an informational asymmetry
that would otherwise exist. 174 Take, for instance, credit rating
agencies. By providing the public with information about the
creditworthiness of a financial instrument at a low cost, credit rating
agencies enable investors to participate in the market and allow
corporations to raise capital. 175 This role becomes even more
important as securities become increasingly complex, since fewer
investors are able to adequately assess the information that they do
have. And, by providing assurance to investors that a corporation's
disclosures are accurate, gatekeepers compel corporations to make
accurate disclosures. Without gatekeepers' diligence and certification,
corporations would be incentivized to economize on the information
asymmetry and profit at the expense of investors, making investors
hesitant to invest out of fear that they would be sold "lemons." 17 6
Gatekeepers, by acting as informational intermediaries, lower
corporations' ability to economize on information asymmetries, thereby
forcing them to act in a lawful manner.
Third, the gatekeeper must have acquired reputational capital
over many years that it pledges to ensure the accuracy of a
corporation's representations and which it would not rationally
sacrifice for a single client or fee. According to Professor John Coffee, a
seminal figure in the academic literature on gatekeeper theory, this
pledge of reputational capital is the key feature that distinguishes
gatekeepers from other types of certifiers. 177 In order for a
gatekeeper's verification to be credible, the gatekeeper must have
spent many years performing similar services for numerous clients.
The more often a firm is retained to serve as a gatekeeper, the more
expertise it builds in its field and the more valuable its pledge of
accuracy becomes. 1 7 8 In most markets, the mere name of a specific

174. See Andrew F. Tuch, Multiple Gatekeepers, 96 VA. L. REV. 1583, 1594 (2010).
175. See, e.g., Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: The Role of Credit Rating
Agencies: HearingBefore the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, 111th Cong. (2010)
(statement of Richard Michalek, Former Vice President Sr. Credit Officer, Structured
Derivative Products Group, Moody's Investors Service), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/i
mo/medialdoc/STMTMICHALEKRichardFormerMoodys.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TT7NWDK7] (archived Aug. 3, 2018).
176. See Tuch, supra note 174, at 1595.
177. See COFFEE, supra note 167.
178. See Cunningham, supranote 173, at 334.
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gatekeeping firm providing its stamp of approval suffices to signal to
the market that a corporation's disclosures are accurate.
Fourth, there must be an optimal liability regime in place that
incentivizes the gatekeeper to perform its gatekeeping function and to
do so properly. Optimal deterrence theory posits that liability rules will
influence the conduct of actors, who make rational behavioral decisions
based on the known legal consequences of their actions. 179 In the
gatekeeping context, an optimal liability regime is twofold. First, in
order to incentivize a gatekeeper to take on a gatekeeping role in the
first place, the aggregate costs of wrongdoing must exceed the
aggregate costs of precautions. 180 Second, on a normative level,
because a gatekeeper receives a smaller payout for certifying
information than the principal makes from the transaction, a lesser
expected penalty should suffice to deter the gatekeeper from making a
false certification. 181 This is especially true given the loss in
reputational capital that a gatekeeper would suffer as a result of
verifying a false representation.
Last, there must be adequate competition in the gatekeeping
industry; the costs of entry cannot be prohibitive. If gatekeeping
responsibilities for an entire industry are concentrated in the hands of
a few firms, the reputational effect of failure begins to wane. In
addition, without active competition, firms are able to maintain their
business without investing in innovative technology or research,
leading to organizational slack. 182 Lock-in problems may also arise
once a firm has been chosen-a client may be reluctant to switch
gatekeeping firms because it becomes costly and outsiders will wonder
whether the switch indicates a problem with the client. That being
said, where a gatekeeper operates a near monopoly, the firm may be
18 3
more equipped to resist pressure from the client.
2. Financial Institutions Treated as Gatekeepers
By viewing US anti-money laundering laws and enforcement
policies through the lens of gatekeeper theory, it becomes apparent
why financial institutions have, for the most part, retreated from
offering their services to money-service businesses: financial
institutions were given gatekeeping responsibilities without the
necessary incentives for a functional model. If international antimoney laundering laws are applied to financial institutions that settle

179.
ANALYSIS
180.
181.
182.
183.

See Tuch, supra note 174, at 1606 (citing STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC
OF ACCIDENT LAW (Harv. Univ. Press 2007)).
See id.
See id.
See COFFEE, supra 167, at 318.
See id.

1142

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 51:1109

mobile money transactions in a similar fashion, we can expect mobile
money customers to lose access to stable banking institutions as well.
In the MSB context, financial institutions are treated as
gatekeepers in a variety of ways. Financial institutions are third
parties that can and have prevented MSB participants from entering
the market. MSBs, such as money transmitters and check cashers,
require banking services in order to operate, and when banks refuse to
take on MSBs as clients, MSBs are unable to carry out transactions for
their customers. 1 84
Furthermore, financial institutions are required by law to monitor
their clients-and, in the case of MSBs, their clients' clients-and
ensure they are complying with applicable laws and regulations.
However, as described in Part V.B, financial institutions lacked the
information necessary to monitor the MSBs' clients, and they had to
rely on MSBs to institute their own anti-money laundering controls,
including customer due diligence and KYC. 185 Although it was
extremely difficult for banks to identify suspicious activity taking place
at the MSB-customer level, the government continued to hold banks
accountable for monitoring and reporting on those customers. "[O]ne
banker has analogized this process as running a railroad and being
expected to monitor everyone who takes your trip to see if their trip is
legitimate."18 6
And, in several instances, an investigation of an MSB led the
government to criminally investigate or prosecute the MSB's bank due
to the bank's failure to "properly administer the MSB account." 1 8 7
Banks ultimately determined that the costs of compliance outweighed
the fees generated by banking MSBs. For instance, in 2012, HSBC was
fined a record $1.2 billion after the Senate Permanent Subcommittee
on Investigations found that the bank had failed to put in place
adequate anti-money laundering controls. 1 8 8 Even though this fine
was focused on HSBC's own anti-money laundering controls, the bank
shortly thereafter withdrew their services from MSBs. This decision
was likely due, at least in part, to the fact that it would be difficult for
the bank to ensure that its MSB clients were deploying their own

184. MSBs are licensed by the state, and states generally require MSBs to have a
banking relationship in order to comply with the regulations. See generally Update on
MSBs, supra note 124.
185. MSBs engage in a high volume of cash transactions with third party
customers who are unknown to the MSB's bank, meaning the bank could not verify the
customers' identities or obtain first-hand knowledge regarding the transaction. See infra
Part V.B.
186. Update on MSBs, supranote 124, at 47.
187. Id.
188. See Rebecca Brace, Money-service businesses seek new banking suitors as
regulations bite, EUROMONEY (June 19, 2013), http://www.euromoney.com/Article/32207
5 3 /Money-service-businesses-seek-new-banking-suitors-as-regulations-bite.html [https:
//perma.cc/27SN-SWX3] (archived Aug. 3, 2018).
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adequate anti-money laundering controls. Regulators, rather than
address the issue of MSB controls directly, focused their attention on
the banks providing services to the MSBs, which have much greater
9
technological and financial resources. 18
Despite all of these gatekeeper-like responsibilities, financial
institutions lacked the incentives necessary for a gatekeeper model to
properly function. Financial institutions made very little money
banking MSBs, they gained no advantage from their reputational
capital in the industry since there was no competition and very little
transparency, and there was not an optimal liability regime in place,
as shown by the severe penalties placed on the financial institutions
190
for wrongs committed by other parties.
It appears possible, and even probable, that international antimoney laundering laws, which are based on and nearly identical to US
anti-money laundering laws, will have a similar deterrent effect on
financial institutions that operate or are involved in mobile money
programs. As in the MSB context, financial institutions that settle
mobile money transactions are treated as gatekeepers without the
191
necessary incentives that exist in a successful gatekeeper model.
For the gatekeeper model to work, there needs to be an optimal liability
regime in place and gatekeepers must be properly incentivized to
perform their responsibilities. Neither characteristic exists in the
mobile money context. Yet we want financial institutions to take on
some of the monitoring and influencing duties that the law already
assigns to them: financial institutions have greater resources at their
disposal for preventing money laundering and terrorism, they are far
more stable sources of banking than smaller, local outlets, and they
have the capacity to provide their customers with access to global
financial services. For all of these reasons, the international
community should review the current anti-money laundering
recommendations and consider amending the laws to align with the
gatekeeper theory model.

189. See id. (quoting a commentator as stating that "[i]f you want to fine someone,
fine someone who has got money"); see also Update on MSBs, supra note 124, at 35 ("The
more heat that is brought on the banking industry, the less it can afford to appear to be
associated with those who look even slightly suspicious to some eyes.").
190. See infra Part V.B.
191. See infra Appendix A.
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B. Solutions Based on Gatekeeper Theory
There are a variety of steps based on gatekeeper theory that the
international community can and should take to prevent financial
institutions from avoiding or eventually exiting the mobile money
business. To be clear, this Article is not arguing that financial
institutions are gatekeepers in mobile money transactions in the same
way that gatekeepers exist in the financial markets. Gatekeepers in
capital markets resolve information asymmetries and increase market
transparencies, resulting in a lower cost of capital. In mobile money
transactions, financial institutions are a necessary participant in a
financial transaction. However, as discussed above, international antimoney laundering laws assign financial institutions gatekeeper-like
responsibilities and gatekeeper theory can therefore be applied to
create a functioning regime.
1. Implement an Optimal Liability Regime
First, international legislatures should determine the optimal
level of liability and ensure that regulators enforce anti-money
laundering laws in a consistent, fair, and predictable manner. The
history of MSBs in the United States indicates that the current antimoney laundering regime, if enforced similarly in the mobile money
context, places too much regulatory liability on financial institutions
involved in mobile money transactions. Optimal liability in mobile
money programs must be achieved on multiple levels. First, there is an
institution's anti-money laundering program itself. Not only is it
important that financial institutions do their best to prevent money
laundering and terrorist financing, but also there is a strong advantage
to having bad actors attempt to use formal financial channels: the
money is far more easily traceable than cash. Governments should
align with financial institutions in the fight against money laundering
and terrorist financing, rather than attack the institutions for political
purposes in an attempt to gain a big payday and significant publicity.
Regulators should work closely with financial institutions to
design and implement their anti-money laundering programs. If
regulators detect anti-money laundering deficiencies, rather than fine
the institution large sums of money, regulators should help the
institutions improve their programs. As part of the anti-money
laundering program, it makes sense to apply a risk-based approach,
but regulators and institutions must be able to differentiate between
high-risk transactions and low-risk transactions. If all mobile money
transactions are ultimately deemed "high risk," since it is difficult for
an institution to truly know the participants in the transaction, or if
financial institutions are required to determine for themselves what
constitutes "high risk," financial institutions will exit the industry,
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leaving companies with less stability and resources to complete the
transactions. 1 92
Moreover, at a transactional level, when money laundering is
detected by an institution, we want the institution to quickly and
without concern for its own liability notify the government and
coordinate with the government to identify the wrongdoer. FATF
Recommendation 20 requires countries to implement a reporting
system in line with the US reporting system along with sanctions for
193
failure by a financial institution to file a suspicious activity report.
However, there are a variety of differences between developed and
developing countries that may prevent this system from being effective
in the developing world. For instance, the FATF (rightly) set forth
instances where it may be appropriate to apply simplified customer
due diligence procedures, such as where there is difficulty obtaining
proof of identity and address and with respect to certain low-risk
products. 194 But where simplified customer due diligence measures
are used, institutions may lack the information necessary to file a
suspicious activity report, potentially resulting in harsh penalties for
failure to file the report.
Furthermore, compliance with reporting requirements is
expensive and requires substantial expertise along with resources.
Institutions in developing countries may lack the resources necessary
to establish and employ sophisticated reporting systems, and if they
decide to settle mobile money transactions, they will likely pass
compliance costs onto consumers through increased service fees,
195
reducing mobile money accessibility.
Moreover, because the FATF standards do not apply a risk-based
approach to the reporting of suspicious activity, institutions must
report suspicious transactions that are low value and high volume, like
many mobile money transactions.1 9 6 This system will likely result in

192. See supra Part V.B. The World Bank has created a tool that allows a country
or a financial institution to put information regarding specific money laundering and
terrorist financing parameters into an excel template and the module produces a risk
assessment of the product. See 2017 FATF GUIDANCE, supra note 74, at 7. If the
assessment indicates a low risk of money laundering or terrorist financing, the country
or financial institution can be more confident in applying simplified AML/CFT measures
to that product. While this tool is certainly a step in the right direction towards
identifying situations under which simplified CDD measures should be applied,
institutions cannot be confident that their use of the tool will protect them from liability,
especially if the country has not amended its regulations to allow simplified CDD
measures relating to that product.
193. FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 19, at 20.
194. See FATF ANTI-MONEY, supra note 71 (providing illustrations of methods for
verifying a person's address and identity where that person lacks a formal registered
address or formal identification).
195. See Miriam Goldby, Reporting of Suspicious Activity by Mobile Money Service
Providersin Accordance with InternationalStandards:How Does it Impact on Financial
Inclusion?, 8 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 401, 411 (2013).
196. See id.
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institutions filing numerous reports as a defensive policy, to protect

themselves from harsh sanctions, to government units ill-equipped to
handle or be able to effectively review and investigate genuine cases of
money laundering or terrorist financing.1 9 7
The optimal level of liability for a financial institution involved in
a mobile money transaction must be low enough to encourage the
institution to remain in the industry but high enough to encourage the
institution to take proper precautions in ferreting out bad behavior.
Regulators should encourage financial institutions to only report truly
suspicious behavior and refrain from punishing financial institutions
for failing to report behavior that, when reviewed in hindsight, was not
actually suspicious or indicative of a financial crime. This can be
achieved by conducting annual workshops where regulators and
financial institutions review a variety of SARs filed over the previous
year and discuss whether or not a SAR was necessary in that instance.
These workshops should include multiple institutions to ensure that
regulators enforce the law consistently across institutions.
Additionally, if a financial institution fails to identify and report
suspicious activity in line with a country's anti-money laundering laws,
the government should hold the institution accountable, but on a much
smaller scale than what has happened in the United States.1 9 8 Like
the federal sentencing guidelines in the United States, legislatures
could determine a sliding scale for anti-money laundering-related
penalties ex ante. Doing so would have the dual effect of (1) reducing
concern within institutions that they will be subject to excessive fines
for nonprofitable services while (2) restricting regulators from seeking
excessive fines. If regulators are aware that they will only be able to
penalize financial institutions a limited amount of money for failing to
file a SAR in relation to a mobile money payment, they will be more
likely to coordinate with the institution in the first place rather than
initiate an expensive and time-consuming investigation. Similarly, if a
financial institution does identify suspicious activity that took place,
the government should grant that institution absolute immunity from
liability related to that transaction and the anti-money laundering
control failure that led to that transaction being missed and should
instead work with the institution to prevent that from happening in
the future. 1 9 9

197. Defensive SARs are not limited to developing countries. In the past, the FATF
has criticized countries for low volumes of SARs, resulting in over-reporting to appease
the FATF. See id. at 415.
198. For a chart depicting BSA AML fines for MSBs between 2012 and 2015, see
KRISTIN PULLAR, ADVANCING FINANCIAL CRIME PROFESSIONALS WORLDWIDE, BLANKET
DE-RISKING OF MONEY SERVICE BuSINESSES 4 (2016).

199. See Goldby, supra note 195, at 416 (noting that in certain circumstances, it
may be most effective to do away with the traditional SAR system and instead grant
government agencies access to an institution's records on a person under investigation).
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2. Offer Financial Institutions Incentives
. Second, in order to encourage financial institutions to become or
remain involved in mobile money programs, governments should
increase the incentives for providing services. Mobile money
transactions generate low fees for financial institutions but represent
high risks for sanctions and other penalties. Governments could offer
corporate subsidies or tax incentives to institutions that settle mobile
money transactions, especially for consumers that lack access to formal
financial services. Corporations enjoy the benefits of subsidies in
numerous industries that are considered beneficial for the public, such
as low-income housing development, clean energy resources, and
agriculture. By providing large swaths of populations with access to
affordable and stable financial services, mobile money services are
crucial to increasing financial inclusion in developing countries and
certainly fit into the types of social goals covered by government
subsidies.
In fact, governments could go even further and reward
institutions that identify criminals attempting to utilize the services
for financial crimes. For instance, in line with the reputational capital
model, governments should publicize when a financial institution
identifies or prevents money laundering or terrorist financing. Doing
so would both convey to the community that the financial institution is
playing a role in preventing money laundering and increasing financial
integrity, and signal to money launderers and terrorist financiers that
they will have difficulty laundering money through the institution.
3. Build Reputational Capital
Last, we should enable financial institutions to build reputational
capital in the mobile money industry. Reputational capital is
imperative in a gatekeeper model because it cannot be achieved
without expertise and resources, and it signals to consumers-who, in
developing countries, are particularly skeptical of digital banking
services to begin with-that their money will be safe and their financial
transactions properly processed. Building reputational capital requires
financial institutions to become involved in and remain in the mobile
money industry, which, as discussed above, will not take place without
an optimal liability regime or financial incentives for financial
institutions. In addition, a properly functioning reputational capital
market requires both competition and transparency. Governments
should incentivize multiple financial institutions in their country to
provide mobile money services and should refrain from promoting or
aligning with only one institution. For instance, Kenya's
communications regulator faced significant criticism after shelving a
recommendation to split up Safaricom's market dominance by obliging
the company to implement interoperability between M-PESA and
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other mobile money services. 2 00 As a result, Safaricom and Airtel
Kenya are now piloting an interoperability program. 20 1
Without a competitive market, financial institutions would not
have to preserve and protect their reputation for providing safe and
reliable services and they could afford to be less accountable toward
their clients, potentially leading to a "race to the bottom." In
coordination with increasing competition, governments should
enhance transparency in the mobile money field so participants can
differentiate between good and bad service providers. For instance,
governments can create a database or rating system that signals to the
marketplace
whether a financial institution accurately and
expeditiously settles mobile money transactions, and, as discussed
above, regulators should broadcast instances of financial institutions
identifying or preventing suspicious activity. This is in sharp contrast
to the current system in the United States, which requires absolute
confidentiality when a covered institution files a SAR. 20 2

VI.

CONCLUSION

As set forth in this Article, the anti-money laundering policies
being promoted throughout the developing world are likely to cause
financial institutions to terminate their relationships with mobile
money providers, resulting in less-secure financial transactions for
unbanked and underbanked populations. This conclusion is based on
the history of MSBs in the United States, which lost their access to
banking services due to severe penalties, overzealous regulators, and
stringent anti-money laundering regulations that were applied in
unpredictable ways. This Article has proposed that the international
community and international legislatures look to the gatekeeper
theory of liability to create anti-money laundering systems that will
encourage financial institutions to become and remain involved in
mobile money transactions. Once an optimal liability regime has been
created and there are proper incentives and competition in place,
financial institutions will be able to safely and securely facilitate

200. See James Barton, Kenya regulator under fire for timid approach to
Safaricom's
dominance,
DEVELOPING
TELECOMs
(Jan.
4,
2018),
https://www.developingtelecoms.com/business/regulation/7524-kenya-regulator-underfire-for-timid-approach-to-safaricom-s-dominance.html
[https://perma.cc/T9XY-9RZD]
(archived Aug. 3, 2018). Although there are three mobile operators in Kenya, Safaricom
claims 72 percent of wireless connections and 81 percent of mobile money users. Id.
201. See Safaricom, Airtel to pilot mobile money interoperabilityon Monday, CIO
EAST AFRICA (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.cio.co.ke/safaricom-airtel-test-mobile-moneyinteroperability-monday/ [https://perma.cc/4GM7-GFAM] (archived Oct. 1, 2018).
202. See FinCEN Rule Strengthens SAR Confidentiality, FIN. CRIMES
ENFORCEMENT NETWORK (Nov. 23,
2010), https://www.fincen.gov/news/newsreleases/fincen-rule-strengthens-sar-confidentiality
[https://perma.cc/SPX6-XU2Z]
(archived Aug. 3, 2018).

2018]

THE GROWTH OF MOBILE MONEY

1149

mobile money transactions throughout the developing world, thereby
allowing people who have always lacked access to banking services the
opportunity to participate in the financial system for the first time.
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Appendix A

AML Program

Risk

Determination

Recordkeeping

Reportable

Transactions

KYC: Customer
Identification

Program

US Anti-Money
Laundering Laws
Financial Institutions (FIs)
must
establish
AML
programs including internal
policies,
procedures,
and
controls; designate a head
compliance officer; perform
ongoing employee training
programs; and develop an
independent
testing
mechanism. PATRIOT Act §
352.
FIs must create a formal risk
profile to identify products,
services, and customers that
create higher risk. PATRIOT
Act § 352.
FIs
must
maintain
all
documents used to establish
identify for fiye years after a
relationship ends; FIs must
maintain
currency
transaction report (CTR) and
SAR documents for five years
after filing a report. BSA, 31
C.F.R.
110.410(a)(4);
1010.430; 1010.306(a)(2).
FIs must report CTRs over
$10,000 in one business day.
BSA. 31 C.F.R. 1010.311.

FIs must gather and verify
their
customer's
identification before opening
an account. PATRIOT Act §
326.

FATF Recommendations
Countries must implement laws
requiring FIs to create
and
implement an AML program that
takes into account the money
laundering and terrorist financing
risks
for
the
country.
Recommendation 1.

FIs must determine the extent of
their CDD measures using a riskbased
approach
(RBA).
Recommendation 10.
FIs must maintain, for at least five
years, all necessary records on
transactions to enable them to
comply swiftly with information
requests from authorities. FIs must
keep all records obtained through
CDD measures for at least five
years
after
the
business
relationship
is
terminated.
Recommendation 11.
Countries should consider the
feasibility and utility of a system
where FIs report large cash
transactions
"above
a
fixed
amount." Interpretive Note to
Recommendation 29.
FIs must gather and verify their
customer's identification before
opening an account, including
identifying the beneficial owner.
Recommendation 10.
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KYC: Customer
Due Diligence
and
(CDD)
Enhanced Due
Diligence
(EDD)

FIs must determine the
normal
and
expected
activities for a customer and
must monitor the customer's
activity to determine whether
it diverges from the expected
customer profile. PATRIOT
Act § 352.

Suspicious

FIs must identify suspicious
activities and report them
through the use of SARs. FIs
must file SARs for, among
abuse;
insider
others,
to
aggregating
violations
$5,000 or more where a
suspect can be identified;
to
aggregating
violations
$25,000 or more regardless of
a potential suspect; and
transactions aggregating to
$5,000 or more that involve
potential money laundering
or violations of the BSA. BSA.
12 C.F.R. 21.11(c).

~1-

Activity
Reporting
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FIs must determine the expected
activities for a
and normal
monitor the
must
and
customer
determine
to
activity
customer's
from the
diverges
it
whether
FIs must
profile.
customer
expected
measures
CDD
also undertake
certain
out
carrying
when
15,000
USD/EUR
over
transactions
of
suspicion
is
there
or where
terrorist
or
laundering
money
financing, or when the FI has
doubts about the veracity of
customer
obtained
previously
identification data.
Recommendation 10.
If an FI suspects or has reasonable
grounds to suspect that funds are
the proceeds of a criminal activity,
it must report its suspicions to a
unit.
intelligence
financial
Recommendation 20.
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